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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

NEW HAMPSillRE INSURANCE

c·o,MPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

No.10245

BALL·ARD-W AD·E, INC., Err' .AJL,.

Defendants-Appellants

This is a civil suit brought by an insurancH company on a theory of absolute liability to recover from
the lessees amounts expended by the insurance company in repairing fire damage to the leased premises.

DJ.SPOISI TION IN 'THE LOWER ICO·URT
1

The lower court ruled that as a matter of law the
lease imposed absolute liability on the lessees and, accordingly, limited the non-jury trial solely to the question of amount of damages. Judgment was awarded
the insurance company in the amount of $4,200.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
RE·LIEF SOUGHT ON AP'PEAL
The appellants seek a reversal of the judgment
below and a remand with instructions to enter judgment
in their favor against the insurance company, or in the
alternative, a new trial.

·The Patricia Graff Trust (called lessor), not a party
to this action, leased certain premises in Salt Lake City,
Utah, to the defendants-appellants (called lessee). (R.
13) There was a substitution of parties to the lease, not
material to this controv€rsy. (R.13)
During the term of the lease, a fire occurred on the
premises. (R. 13) 'The lessor assured the lessee that
insurance would take care of the repair. (R. 120) No
de·mand or request was made upon the lessee to repair
the damage, the lessor making all arrangements for the
repair. (R. 119) Plaintiff-respondent, New Hampshire
Insurance Company, (called insurance company) caused
repairs to be effected. ( R. 13)
Over a year and a half later, the insurance company
initiated this action against the lessee by a two count
complaint. The first count sounded in negligence. (R. 1,
13) The alternative second count was based on the
theory that one paragraph in the lease (paragraph 8, entitled Indemnity) (R. 18) imposed absolute liability as a
matter of law on the lessee for damage to the premises.
(R. 2, 14, 57)
Although the pretrial order would have required a
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3
finding of negligence against the lessee in order that
liability be imposed under the second count of the
complaint (R. 14), on motion of the insurance company
and before the taking of any evidence, the trial court
ruled that the indemnity provision of the lease imposed
absolute liability on the lessee. (R. 22, minute entry;
R. 58, lines 19-21) 'The trial court determined, at the
request of the insurance company, that negligence on the
part of the lessee need not be shown and that the only
issue which the court would hear was the question of the
amount of damages. (R. 58, line 21)
The trial court sustained the insurance company's
objections to the lessee's offer of proof that the lease was
drafted by the lessor's attorney, and an offer of proof
as to the intent of the parties with reference to the effect of the maintenance provision (paragraph 4) and the
indemnity provision (paragraph 8) of the lease. (R. 63)
On motion of the insurance company, its negligence
count was dismissed without prejudice. (R. 22, minute
entry; (R. 58)
After hearing evidence the trial court, sitting without a jury, rendered judgment against the lessee in the
amount of $4,200.
T·he parts of the lease, which is set forth in full in the
record (R. 17-19), relevant to the issues on appeal are:

. 4. MAINTE.NAN~c·E : . . . Lessee agrees
~t Its. own ~xpense to maintain all the said premIses,. Including. roof: exterior, interior, plumbing,
heating, electrical fixtures and glass in the build-
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4
ing on said premises in a good and useable condi~
tion, and to maintain the hard surfacing of the
premises in a good and useable condition, and at
the expiration of this lease or sooner termination
thereof to surrender said premises in as good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear,
unavoidable damage by fire, the elements or other
casualties excepted. . . .
and
8. INDEMNITY: The Lessee will exonerate, save harmless, protect and indemnify Lessor
from and against any and all losses, damages,
claims, suits or actions, judgments and costs which
shall arise or grow out of any injury to or death
of persons and/ or damage to property, caused by,
arising from, or in any manner connected with the
exercise of any right granted or conferred hereby,
or the use, maintenance, operation and/or repair
of the said premises, buildings, equipment, machinery, and appliances thereon, whether sustained by Lessee or Lessor, their respective agents
or employees or by any other persons or corporations which seek to hold the Lessor liable.
ARGUMEIN'T
POINT I.
THE T'RIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE MoTION OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY T'HAT, .AJS A MATER O·F LAW, THE LE.ASE IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABILITY ON THE LESSEE:
A.

BECAUSE PROPER CO·NSTRUCTION OF THE
LEASE SH 0WS THAT ABSOLUTE LIABILITY WAS
NO·T IN·TENDED BY T'HE PARTIES.
1

It 'vas at the insistence of the insurance company
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5
that the trial court ruled that the lease imposed absolute
liability on the lessee and refused to hear any evidence
but that bearing solely on the issue of the amount of
damages. Although the lessee was prepared to litigate
fully all issues fairly raised by the complaint, the
insurance company chose to rest its case entirely upon
the theory that the indemnity provision of the lease
i1nposed absolute liability on the lessee. It is the lessee's
contention that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter
of la'v that the lease in1posed absolute liability on the
lessee.
It should be noted that paragraph 4, entitled Maintenance, deals with maintenance of the premises and the
duty of the lessee to the lessor with reference to repair
and maintenance of the premises by the lessee and the
conditions, qualifications and exceptions of such requirenlent. It surely does not impose absolute liability or any
semblance of it.
On the other hand, paragraph 8, entitled Indemnity,
is a broadly drawn provision purporting to provide that
the lessee will save the lessor harmless from losses arising out of the use of the premises. While its language
is not a model of clarity, it is clearly primarily intended
to protect the lessor from claims of third parties which
might arise out of the lessee's activity on the leased
premises.
A lease is a contract and as such is properly interpreted by the long and well established rules of contract
interpretation. In the interpretation of any contract, the
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cardinal p-rinciple is that the intent of the parties should
be ascertained. Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty Co.,
51 Utah 78, 168 Pac. 966 (1917).
The most important rule used in determining thP
intent of the parties to a written instrument is that the
instrument should be read as a whole and effect given
to all of its provisions if possible. Minkoff v. McLean,
295 P'a. 396, 145 Atl. 534 (1929'). In Neal D. Ivey Co.
v. Franklin Associates, lnc., 370 Pa. 225, 87 A.2d 236
( 1952) the court said, at page 239 :
It is a rule of universal application that in
construing a contract each and every part of it
must be taken into consideration and given effect
if possible, and that the intention of the parties
must be ascertained from the entire instrument.
An interpretation will not be given to one part
of a contract which will annul another part of it.
It is but logical, sensible and just that a contract
be construed so that all of its provisions be given effect,
if possible. Hull v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 119 F.2d
12.3 ( 19·41) ; Restatement of ~Contracts, § 236 (c).
Corbin states the rule in the following language:
If the apparent inconsistency is between a
clause that is general and broadly inclusive in
character and one that is more limited and specific in its coverage, the latter should generally be
held to operate as a modification and pro tanto
nullification of the former. 3 ~Corbin on Contracts,
§ 547, p. 176 (1960).
The reason for the rule is that the specific provision
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more exactly states the intention of the parties than the
broad or general clause. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Markha1n, 106 Colo. 509, 107 P.2d 313 (19·4 0); Smith
v. Russ, 184 Kan. 773, 339 P.2d 286 (19'5 9); Wilder v.
Wilder, 138 'Cal. App.2d 152, 291 P.2d 79 (1955).
In Smith, supra, one provision of a lease provided
that the lessee ". . . shall not release or sublease said
premises, or any portion thereof or assign this lease nor
shall there be any renewal or extension of the same
without written consent.... " of the lessor. Another provision more specifically provided that the lessee " ... has
the option of extending this lease for an additional five
(5) years .... " The court ruled that the specific provision
would control over the general one to the extent necessary to give effect to the specific provision.
In Wilder, supra, where one provision purported to
cover all claims and another purported to cover specific,
enumerated claims, the court held that the general provision must give way to the extent needed to accominodate the specific provision.
In the instant controversy, the indemnity provision
is sweepingly broad and general in its terms, seemingly
unlimited as to persons, property or damages involved,
while the maintenance provision, on the other hand, is
very specific, setting forth in detail the duty of the
lessee to the lessor with reference to the leased premises.
The specific maintenance provision sets forth with exactitude the property with which it is concerned, the degree
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and extent of duty involved, and the exceptions to this
duty.
Unde-r the view vYhich the insurance company induced
the trial court to adopt, paragraph 4 is an absolute
nullity. It is as though it were never agreed upon and
included in the lease by the parties at all. Under the
insurance company's interpretation of the lease (to
which it was not a party) the lessor could insure against
any and all loss, damage or injury of any kind to the
premises and upon payment of the claim by the insurance
con1pany, it could hold the lessee absolutely liable, even
for the causes specifically enumerated in the maintenance
prOVlSlOll.
This is an absurd result vvhich flies in the face of
com1non sense and reason and does violence to the primary and fundamental rule that all parts of an instrument will be given effect if possible. All that can be said
for the rule espoused by the insurance company is that it
'vould provide an unearned financial windfall for the
insurance carrier which has already been paid the premiunl it specified for the risk involved. We respectfully
submit that this is insufficent justification for such a
radical change in basic contract law.
Although it is not essential to the proper disposition
of the case, another rule of contract interp·retation used
to reconcile conflicting provisions without going outside
the instrument itself would also require a reversal. This
is the frequently state·d rule that where two provisions
conflict, the first one is given effect and the second
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one gives way. Klever v. Klever, 333 Mich. 179, 52
N.W.2d 653 (19·52) ; Burns v. Peters, 5 'Cal. 2d 619, 55
p .2d 1182 (1936).
In summary, it is the lessee's contention that a proper construction of the lease, without recourse to outside evidence, precludes the conclusion that the lease
imposes absolute liability on the lessee.
POINT I.
THE :TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE MO·TION OF THE INSURAN!CE ·COMPANY T'HAT, .AJS A MATER OF LAW, THE LEASE IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABILITY ON THE LESSEE:
B.

BEICAUSE GRANTING THE RULING R~E·QUES'T'ED
BY 'THE INSURAN·CE COMPANY THAT THE
LEASE IMPOSED ABSO,LUTE LIABILI'T'Y ON THE
LESiSE:E AND THE CONSEQUENT LIMITING O~F
THE ·TRIAL SOLELY TO THE QUESTION 0 F DAMAGES PREJUDICIALLY PRECLUDED THE LES:SE;E
FROM AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHO·W THE ACTUAL
INTEN'T 0 1F THE PARTIES TO THE LEASE.
1

Restricting the issues at trial, at the request of the
insurance company, solely to the question of the amount
of damages deprived the lessee of any opportunity to
utilize two additional rules of contract interpretation
which would have assisted in avoiding the error of holding that the lease imposed absolute liability on the lesseP.
This court has ruled that where there is an ambiguity
in a document, it is to be construed against the one ,vho
wrote it. Gregerson v. Equit,able Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,
123 Utah 152, 256 p·.2d 566 (1953); Jordan v. Madsen, 69
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Utah 112, 25·2 Pac. 570 (1926). 'This is also the restatement rule. Restatement of Contracts, § 236(d).
The insurance company thus led the trial court
further into error by insisting that it exclude, which it
did, evidence as to who drafted the lease. (R. 63)
Another most important and fundamental rule in
contract interpretation is that the parties own interpretation of the instrument should be given great, if not
conclusive, weight. Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 Utah 108, 66
Pac. 773 (1901). :The course of conduct of the insurance
company led the trial court into the further error of
excluding evidence of the interpretation of the parties
to the instrument. (R. 63)
Not only is the interpretation which the parties place
on the instrument important, but also, as pointed out
by this court, preliminary negotiations may show such
intention. Thus in Fayter v. North, 30 Utah 15·6, 83 Pac.
742 (1906) this court allowed extrinsic evidence as to
"rhat the parties meant by "appurtenances" in a deed.
In Bartels v. Brain, 13 Utah 162, 44 Pac. 715 (1896) evidence outside the lease \vas allowed to show what was
meant by "reasonable use."
The evidence and the offer of proof as to the intention of the parties was erroneously precluded to the
prejudicial detriment of the lessee by the theory upon
\Vhich the insurance company chose to try its case. (R.
63) Had this evidence as to the intention of the parties
been adn1itted, it \vould have given the trial court a basis
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upon which to determine whether the parties to the lease
really intended that there be absolute liability, something
less than absolute liability, or whether it was not the
intention of the lessor and lessee that the fire insurance
purchased by the lessor with the proceeds from the rent
inure to the benefit of both lessor and lessee, as is the
generally accepted custom in the business for any other
course of conduct allows the insurance company to collect
twice for the same risk, or as here, collect once for the
risk and then shift the burden it was fully paid to shoulder to one whose use of the premises provided the premiums paid to the insurance carrier.
It is with considerable trepidation that counsel
for the lessee assert that research has failed to disclose
competent authority supporting the position of the insurance company; however, research has failed to reveal
a case where the lessor, let alone an insurance company
fully paid to take the risk, has asserted, let alone prevailed, on the theory inflicted by the insurance company
upon the trial court below.

We respectfully submit that the exclusion of the
evidence as to who drafted the lease and the evidence as
to the intention of the parties with reference to damage
to the premises was prejudicial error.
POINT II.
THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF IN THIS 1CASE IS A
REVERSAL WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO EN'TER JUDGMEN'T
FOR THE LESSEE; HOWEVER, SHOULD THE COURT NOT
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GRANT 'THIS RELIEF, A NEW TRIAL SHO·ULD BE ORDERED.

The insurance company, plaintiff below, could have
tried its case on more than one theory and on more than
one issue. It chose not to do so. Over the objection of
the lessee it chose to rest its entire case on the theory that
the indemnity provision of the lease imposed absolute
liability on the lessee and restricted the issues to be litigated solely to the question of the amount of damages.
'V e must assume that the insurance company stands
upon the theory of absolute liability as the law of the
case for it has not filed a statement of points as is required by rules 74(b) and 75(d) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for a cross appeal. Nor could it with propriety
claim that the trial court erred in sustaining its wishes
for as this court recently stated in Pettingill v. Perkins,
2 Utah 2d 2i66, 272 P.2d 185 (19'54) at page 186, "lie cannot lead the court into error and then be heard to complain thereof. To permit such action would needlessly
prolong litigation, so there n1ight never be :an .end
thereto." Having elected voluntarily his position below
"fie cannot now on appeal shift his theory and position."
The the·ory on which this case was tried below, and
its consequent posture on appeal, were determined by the
insurance con1pany. Under the rule enunciated in Pettingill v. Perkins, supra, that one "cannot lead the court
into error and then be heard to complain thereof" the
appropriate relief in this case is a reversal of the judgJnent below and a remand "ri th instruction to enter judg-
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ment for the lessee. ·T·o do otherwse would unjustly
penalize the lessee who was prepared to litigate all issues
raised by the insurance company's complaint. It would
allow the insurance company to try one theory, then
another, and then yet another, ad infinitum, so that
''there might never he an end thereto."
Should the court, however, not grant the reversal and
remand with instructions to enter judgment for the
lessee, a new trial should be ordered.

For simplicity of language the defendants-appellants have been called by the singular "lessee." As shown,
however, by the Notice of Appeal, this appeal is prosecuted for the benefit of Ballard-Wade, Inc., M. R. Ballard,
Jr. and Loral R. Peterson.
The appellants respectfully pray that this court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with
instructions to enter judgment for the appellants, or in
the alternative to remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARE.NCE 1C. NESLE.N and
LEO A. JARDINE·, JR.
NE,S·LE:N AND Mo,c·K

1003 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake !City, Utah
Attorneys for th.e
Defendants-Appellants
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